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I will not dwell upon the details of the
very simple proposal which would pro-
vide an incentive for railroad manage-
ment to build freight cars essential to
the Nation's needs. It would grant au-
thority to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to fix rental rates which would
provide just and reasonable compensa-
tion to freight car owners and it would
encourage the acquisition and mainte-
nance of a car supply sufficient to meet
the needs of both commerce and the na-
tional defense.
I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal,
and I urge its passage to offer relief to
an important segment of our economy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the committee
amendment.
The bill is open to further amendment.
If there be no further amendment to be
proposed, the question is on the engross-
ment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading, was read the third
time, and passed.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the
House had agreed to the report of the
committee of conference on the amend-
ments of the House to the joint resolu-
tion (S.J. Res. 1) proposing an amend-
ment to the United States Constitution
relating to succession to the Presidency
and Vice-Presidency and to cases where
the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND
VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF
VICE PRESIDENT-CONFERENCE
REPORT
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I submit
a report of the committee of conference
on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses on the amendment of the House
to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 1) pro-
posing an amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States relating to suc-
cession to the Presidency and Vice-Presi-
dency and to cases where the President
is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. I ask unanimous
consent for the present consideration of
the report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The re-
port will be read for the information of
the Senate.
The legislative clerk read the report.
(For conference report, see House pro-
ceedings of today.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the report?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the report.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, we have
before us for final passage Senate Joint
Resolution 1, which is a proposal to
amend the Constitution to assure Presi-
dential succession and authority in our
Government.
The progress of the bill has been the
result of the labors-of many persons, par-
ticularly the President of the United
States, the leadership of this body, the
leadership of the House of Representa-
tives, the executives of the American Bar
Association, and my colleagues on the Ju-
diciary Committee, with particular em-
phasis upon those who labored on the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amend-
ments.
The measure was introduced by myself
on behalf of myself and many other Sen-
ators. It has been slightly modified
from the form in which it was intro-
duced in December 1963. Since then it
has been the subject of two sets of hear-
ing before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments. It has
been studied by the full Committees on
the Judiciary of both the House and the
Senate. It was twice passed in the Sen-
ate by unanimous yea and nay votes, and
it was overwhelmingly approved by the
other body.
Earlier this year the proposed amend-
ment received the full support of the
President of the United States. Earlier
it had been endorsed, as was brought out
in some detail in the debate which en-
sued in this body, by such distinguished
nongovernmental groups as the Ameri-
can Bar Association.
At long last the Senate and House
conferees have completed their studies
of the proposed amendment. A short
while ago the conference report was ap-
proved by the House of Representatives.
All that remains is for this body to ap-
prove the conference report, and then
the measure will be sent to the States for
ratification.
If the Senate acts affirmatively, it will
be the 11th time in the past 90 years that
Congress has submitted a proposed
amendment to the Constitution to the
several States. Of the last 10 that have
been submitted, 9 have been ratified.
We have every reason to believe that
the States will look with favor upon the
proposed amendment, which is not de-
signed really to alter the Constitution,
but rather to fill a void in that great doc-
ument which has existed for 178 years.
As all of us know, the amendment is de-
signed to do three specific things. I
should like hastily to review the three
purposes:
First, the proposed amendment would
make forever clear that when the office
of President becomes vacant, the Vice
President shall become President, not
merely Acting President. We would
clearly state in the Constitution what
has become precedent through the ac-
tions of Vice President Tyler following
the death of the then President Harrison.
Second, if the office of Vice President
should become vacant, the proposed
amendment would provide a means to fill
that office so that we would at all times
have a Vice President of the United
States.
Third, the proposed amendment would
provide a means by which the Vice Presi-
dent may assume the powers and duties
of the Chief Executive when the Presi-
dent is unable-to do so himself.
The conference report, which has now
been approved by the House of Reprei
sentatives, contains certain changes
from the proposal which the Senate ap-
proved earlier this year by a -vote of 72
to 0. I should like to describe those
changes and then urge approval of the
conference report by this body.
In the Senate version of the measure
we prescribed that all declarations con-
cerning the inability of the President or
of his ability to perform the powers and
duties of that office, particularly a dec-
laration concerning his readiness to re-
sume the powers and duties of his office
made by the President of the United
States himself, be transmitted to the
Speaker of the House and to the Presi-
dent of the Senate.
The conference committee report pro-
poses that those declarations go to the
Speaker and to the President pro tem-
pore of the Senate. The reason for the
change is, of course, that the Vice Presi-
dent, who is also the President of the
Senate, would be participating in mak-
ing a declaration of presidential inability,
and therefore would be unable to trans-
mit his own declaration to himself. In
addition, I believe that we would be on
better legal ground not to send the dec-
laration to a party in interest. The
Vice President, who would be shortly as-
suming or seeking to assume the powers
and duties of the office, would indeed be
a party in interest.
In the Senate version of the bill we
did not specify that if the President were
to surrender his powers and duties volun-
tarily-and I emphasize the word "vol-
untarily"-he could resume them im-
mediately upon declaring that his in-
ability no longer existed. We believe
that our language clearly implied this.
Certainly the. intention was made clear
in the debate on the question on the
floor of the Senate and in the record of
our committee hearings, but the At-
torney General of the United States re-
quested that we be more specific on this
point so as to encourage a President to
make a voluntary declaration to the
effect that he was unable to perform the
powers and duties of the office, if it was
necessary for him to do so.
We made that point clear in the con-
ference committee report.
We added specific language enabling
the President to resume his powers and
duties immediately, with no waiting
period, if he had given up his powers
and duties by voluntary declaration.
That had been the intention of the
Senate all along, as I recall the colloquy
which took place on the floor of the
Senate; and we had no objection to mak-
ing that intention crystal clear in the
wording of the proposed constitutional
amendment itself.
In the Senate version we prescribed
that the President, having been divested
of his powers and duties by declaration
of the Vice President and a majority of
the Cabinet, or such other body as Con-
gress by law may provide, could resume
the powers and duties of the office of
President upon his declaration that no
inability existed, unless within 7 days
the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet or the other body issued a dec-
laration challenging the President's in-
tention. The House version prescribed
that the waiting period be 2 days. The
conference compromised on 4 days, and
I urge the Senate to accept that as a
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reasonable compromise between the
time limits imposed by the two bodies.
Furthermore, we have clarified lan-
guage, at the request of the Senate con-
ferees, to make crystal clear that the
Vice President must be a party to any
action declaring the President unable
to perform his powers and duties.
I remember well the words of Presi-
dent Eisenhower before the American
Bar Association conference, when he
said that it is a constitutional obligation
of the Vice President to help make these
decisions. We in the Senate felt that to
be the case, and thus changed the lan-
guage a bit to make it specifically clear.
That, I am sure, had been the inten-
tion of both the Senate and the House,
but we felt that the language was not
specific enough, so we clarified it on that
point.
The Senate conferees accepted a
House amendment requiring the Con-
gress to convene within 48 hours, if they
were not then in session, and if the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet
or the other body were to challenge the
President's declaration that he, the
Chief Executive, were not disabled or,
once again, able to perform the powers
and duties of his office.
We feel that the requirement would
encourage speedy disposition of the
question by the Congress, and I urge its
acceptance by the Senate.
Finally, the Senate version imposed
longtime limitations upon the Congress
to settle a dispute as to whether the
President or the Vice President could
perform the powers and duties of the
office of President. Senators know the
question would come to the Congress
only if the Vice President, who would
then be acting as President, were to
challenge, in conjunction with a major-
ity of the Cabinet, the President's decla-
ration that no inability existed. The
House version imposed a 10-day time
limitation. The Senate conferees were
willing to have a time limitation as a
further safeguard to the President, but
we were unanimous in agreeing that 10
days was too short a period in which to
decide on that grave a question.
The conferees finally agreed to a 21-
day time limitation after which, if the
Vice President had failed to win the
support of two-thirds of both the Houses
of Congress, the President would auto-
matically return to the powers and du-
ties of his office. I urge the Senate to
accept that change.
I should like to specify one thing
further about this particular point since
I feel it is the main point of contention
between the House and the Senate, and
one upon which I was happy to see we
could find some agreement.
First, including a time limitation in
the Constitution of the United States
would impose upon those who come after
us in this great body a limitation on their
discussion and deliberation when sur-
rounded by contingencies which we can-
not foresee. The Senate conferees felt
that a 10-day time limitation was too
shortBa period. - .'
:Our feeling in the Senate, ~as repre-
sented bygt~e views of the conferees, was
that"wel should go slowly in iamposing a
maximum time limitation if we could
not foresee the contingencies that might
confront those who were forced to make
their determination as to who would be
the President of the United States. I be-
lieve 21 days is a reasonable time. I
emphasize that it is our feeling that this
is not necessarily an absolute period.
The 21 days need not always be used.
In my estimation, most decisions would
be made in a shorter time. But if the
Nation were involved in a war or other
international crisis, and the President
had suffered an illness whose diagnosis
might be difficult, a longer time might be
needed, and the maximum of 21 days
that was agreed upon might be required.
It should be made clear that if during
the 21-day limit one House of Congress,
either the Senate or the House of Rep-
resentatives, voted on the issue as to
whether the President was unable to per-
form his powers and duties, but failed to
obtain the necessary two-thirds major-
ity to sustain the position of the Vice
President and the Cabinet, or whatever
other body Congress in its wisdom might
prescribe at some future date, the issue
would be decided in favor of the Presi-
dent. In other words, if one House
voted but failed to get the necessary two-
thirds majority, the other House would
be precluded from using the 21 days and
the President would immediately re-
assume the powers and duties of his
office.
I feel that further remarks are un-
necessary. I thank all who have made
it possible for us to bring the amend-
ment to this stage, especially the dis-
tinguished Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
HRUSKA].
I observe in the Chamber the father
of the last constitutional amendment to
be adopted, the distinguished Senator
from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], whose ad-
vice I shall be seeking with respect to the
method of approaching State legisla-
tures.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BAYH. I yield.
Mr. HOLLAND. I compliment the
Senator from Indiana warmly on the
fine service he has rendered to the Sen-
ate and the Nation. I hope he will have
early success in obtaining action by the
43 State legislatures whose ratification
of the amendment is necessary before it
becomes a part of the Constitution. I
believe he will receive that kind of ac-
tion, because the Nation realizes that in
these perilous times this difficult ques-
tion, which has been pending for so long,
should have this method of solution
available at all times, and as speedily as
possible.
I wish I could help the Senator from
Indiana in relation to his contacts with
Governors and State legislatures. But
judging by the fine ability that he has
shown in consulting others up to this
time, he certainly needs no suggestions
from me or from anyone else.
May I ask the distinguished Senator a
question?
Mr.BAYH. Yes.
Mr. HOLLAND. Is it the Senator's
intention to ask for a quorum call and
then to ask for the yeas and nays
Mr. BAYH. That is not my intention.
Inasmuch as the Senate has voted on
much the same proposal by a substantial
margin on two occasions; inasmuch as
the House, when it concurred in the con-
ference report, did not take a yea-and-
nay vote; and inasmuch as some Sena-
tors are not present at this time, I be-
lieve it is really unnecessary to have a
yea-and-nay vote.
Mr. HOLLAND. I shall defer, of
course, to the views of the distinguished
Senator, who is the principal author and
cosponsor of the measure, and to the
views of the majority leader and the act-
ing minority leader, who are in the
Chamber.
I believe it would be impressive-and
this is the only comment I shall have to
make-when action is taken by the
States if more than one or two Senators
had affirmatively espoused a particular
version of an amendment which had
reached State legislatures. But I shall
gladly defer to the judgment of the Sen-
ator from Indiana and the majority
leader and acting minority leader.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I join
the Senator from Indiana in urging the
adoption of the conference report.
The proposed constitutional amend-
ment is a correction of a long-exposed
defect in the organization of our National
Government. The amendment provides
for a solution of the disastrous but in-
evitable situation that would confront
the Nation in the event of a fallen leader
of the Nation, either because of violence,
illness, or disability. It has been a
troublesome problem, one which has pro-
vided many uneasy moments to the peo-
ple of the Nation from time to time dur-
ing our history.
In the course of examining the prob-
lem, we have found that there is an in-
finity of contingencies which could be
raised in any number of hypothetical
situations. If we ever tried to provide
for all of them or for any substantial
number of them, it would require an
infinite number of days or months, or
perhaps years, to continue the debate on
this subject. So we had to fill the
vacuum by agreeing upon the joint res-
olution which is before us as the resolute
action of this body and the other body
and of the conference committee.
I believe the solution is sound. It
would restrict the role of Congress con-
siderably. Under the amendment Con-
gress would act only as an appellate body
in the event there were a difference of
opinion between the President, on the
one hand, as to his ability to return to
his office, and the judgment of the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet,
or some other body that might be con-
stituted by law, which might have an
opinion to the contrary.
Congress by itself would have no
power to initiate a challenge of the
President's ability or inability in this
regard.
I wish to comment upon the role of
the junior Senator from Indiana in the
preparation of the joint resolution, not
only with respect to sponsoring it, but
also ,in.•so consistently pursuing the
background and foundational material.
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That material was gathered in con-
ferences with, for example, representa-
tives of the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association and with the
house of delegates itself. That effort
was followed by many discussions with
professors and scholars learned in the
law, in addition to the committee hear-
ings themselves.
An effort was made to follow the es-
tablished procedures of Congress in both
bodies for the implementation of the
amendment. That was not found to be
possible with respect to the time limita-
tion in section 3 which provides for the
event of the issue of disability being
joined between the President, on the one
hand, and the Vice President and a ma-
jority of the Cabinet, on the other.
In deciding upon a period of 21 days,
I believe we have provided a reasonable
time in which the issue can be canvassed
and acted upon intelligently.
A new duty has been placed upon Con-
gress. It is a duty that lies upon men
and women of good purpose in respond-
ing to the needs of their Nation in a time
of crisis. It is my hope that the amend-
ment will be consistently unneeded.
Nevertheless, such an agreement, as pro-
vided in this fashion, is wise, indeed.
So I join the Senator from Indiana in
urging the Senate to adopt the confer-
ence report and to do whatever any of
us can do toward urging the legislatures
of the several States to ratify the amend-
ment to our organic law, so that it may
be duly promulgated and given force and
effect.
Mr. BAYH. I thank the Senator
from Nebraska for his thoughtful words,
but more particularly for the dedicated
effort, the long, tiresome hours of hear-
ings and conference work, and the con-
stant writing and rewriting that were
necessary to reach the end of the tortu-
ous journey we have been making.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, I congratulate the junior Sen-
ator from Indiana [Mr. BAYT] on the
outstanding job he has done in shep-
herding Senate Joint Resolution 1 from
the realm of abstract proposal to its re-
alization today. Along the way he con-
sulted with a great number of people
about this problem, and he heard a con-
siderable variety of ideas on how it
should be solved. It is to his credit that
he was able, with patience and diplo-
macy, to resolve these differences.
I call to the Senate's attention a most
important aspect of Senate Joint Reso-
lution 1 which has not received as much
notice as it should have. That is the
provision, in section 4, which gives Con-
gress authority to provide by law for a
body other than the Cabinet to determine
the inability of the President to exer-
cise the powers and duties of his office
when he is unwilling to make the dec-
laration of inability himself.
This provision was wisely added by
the framers of Senate Joint Resolution
1 because of the doubts which some peo-
ple voiced as to the workability of using
the Cabinet as the body to determine the
President's inability. Now that we are
finally enacting Senate Joint Resolution
1, we must not cease thinking about this
aspect of the inability problem. We
must keep in mind that we have given
Congress the power to provide a different
body to determine Presidential inability,
and we should engage in a continuing
study of whether there is some better
way to handle this very difficult matter.
The need to engage in continuing re-
examination of whether the Cabinet is
the best available body to determine
Presidential inability is demonstrated by
certain historical evidence which I call
to the Senate's attention today.
I refer to the facts surrounding the
resignation of Robert Lansing as Pres-
ident Wilson's Secretary of State. These
facts were brought to my attention by
Mr. Alien Dulles, who has served the
Government for many years in many
capacities. Secretary Lansing was his
uncle, and Mr. Dulles has made avail-
able certain relevant correspondence and
memorandums, which are now on deposit
at Princeton University and are not yet
available to the public.
Together with Secretary Lansing's cor-
respondence with President Wilson at
the time of the resignation-which is a
matter of public record-these docu-
ments are interesting and revealing.
President Wilson fell ill during the
latter months of 1919. Mr. Lansing,
after consultation with other members
of the Cabinet, decided that it was neces-
sary for the Cabinet to meet and carry
on the affairs of Government as best it
could. About 25 meetings had taken
place, over a period of some 4 months,
when Wilson wrote to Lansing, charged
him with usurpation of Presidential
powers because of the Cabinet meetings,
and asked for his resignation. After
an exchange of letters, Lansing did re-
sign.
There were other reasons for friction
between Lansing and Wilson. They were
at odds over the negotiation of the
Treaty of Versailles and subsequent con-
gressional consideration of the treaty.
Nevertheless, Wilson's inference that the
Presidential Cabinet had usurped power
demonstrates the wisdom of the framers
of this amendment in leaving open to
further consideration the question of
who should decide when the President
is 'disabled.
For the point of the Wilson incident
is that, even though no procedure there
existed for declaring a President to be
disabled and even though there was no
evidence of any overt attempt to usurp
the powers of the President, the ailing
President nevertheless decided to dis-
pose of any Cabinet member who seemed
to present a threat. More serious con-
flict might follow, in a comparable sit-
uation, now that a procedure for deter-
mining disability is established. Indeed,
a President might fire his entire Cabinet.
This is a matter concerning which I
have had numerous conversations with
the Senator from Indiana.
It is true that the committee reports
and other legislative history make it quite
clear that, for purposes of Senate Joint
Resolution 1, the Deputies or Under Sec-
retaries in the various departments
would, when there clearly are vacancies
in the Cabinet, become acting heads of
the departments until new principal offi-
cers were confirmed; or, if Congress were
not in session, until recess appointments
were made. I believe this legislative his-
tory is extremely important, but if the
President did become involved in this
kind of dispute with his Cabinet the situ-
ation would nonetheless be most difficult
and disruptive, especially in a period of
crisis for the United States either domes-
tically or with other countries around the
world.
What could ensue is a conflict as to
who is actually acting as President at
a particular time.
The question that might arise is
whether the President had, in fact, fired
the Cabinet at the time they had met and
decided to put in a new President. What
we could end up with, in effect, would be
the spectacle of having two Presidents
both claiming the right to exercise the
powers and duties of the Presidency, and
perhaps two sets of Cabinet officers both
claiming the right to act.
Thus there are dangers in the amend-
ment, with all due respect to the Senator
from Indiana. Nevertheless, I believe
we should go forward, since the dangers
involved in not enacting Senate Joint
Resolution 1 are greater still and we do
not know whether a procedure better
than Cabinet determination can be
found. Certainly if one were now pos-
sible, I believe the Senator from Indiana
would have found it.
The Senator has wisely left open the
way to further improvement. I urge
that the Congress follow his lead, and
move directly to continued examination
of alternate procedures, to be enacted
by the Congress, for determining when
a President is unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, first of all,
I am indebted to the Senator from New
York, and so is the Senate, not only for
his present statement, but also for the
discussion which he stimulated on the
floor when we were considering the
measure for passage earlier this year.
The Senator points out very correctly
that there is a degree of flexibility in
this measure.
I am not so bold as to suggest that
this is a perfect amendment. I believe
that its perfection is based upon the
ability of the men living at the time when
the measure must be used to cope suc-
cessfully with the problems and contin-
gencies with which they are confronted.
For that reason, we believed that the
Cabinet, as we see it now, is the best
body to serve as a check. However, we
might be wrong. Why close the door?
Why not leave us a degree of leeway so
that when Congress is confronted with
different circumstances than we pres-
ently foresee, it could designate a differ-
ent body and give it authority to act.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, as I said to the Senator from
Indiana, I have strong reservations about
the use of the Cabinet in this matter.
I believe that the Senator from Indiana
has considered my suggestions and
every other suggestion and recommenda-
tion which he has received.
I praise the Senator for coming for-
ward with this legislation, for which he
is more responsible than anyone else. I
should like to ask a series of questions of
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the Senator from Indiana on another as-
pect of the proposed constitutional
amendment. I think this would help
in clarifying another important issue.
I go back to the colloquy which took
place on the floor of the Senate when
the matter was considered a month or
so ago. Is it not true that the inability
to which we are referring in the proposed
amendment is total inability to exercise
the powers and duties of the office?
Mr. BAYH. The inability that we deal
with here is described several times in
the amendment itself as the inability of
the President to perform the powers and
duties of his office.
It is conceivable that a President
might be able to walk, for example, and
thus, by the definition of some people,
might be physically able, but at the same
time he might not possess the mental
capacity to make a decision and perform
the powers and duties of his office. We
are talking about inability to perform the
constitutional duties of the office of
President.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. And
that has to be total disability to per-
form the powers and duties of office.
Mr. BAYH. The Senator is correct.
We are not getting into a position,
through the pending measure, in which,
when a President makes an unpopular
decision, he would immediately be ren-
dered unable to perform the duties of his
office.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it
limited to mental inability to make or
communicate his decision regarding his
capacity and mental inability to perform
the powers and duties prescribed by law?
Mr. BAYH. I do not believe that we
should limit it to mental disability. It is
conceivable that the President might fall
into the hands of the enemy, for example.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. It in-
volves physical or mental inability to
make or communicate his decision re-
garding his capacity and physical or
mental inability to exercise the powers
and duties of his office.
Mr. BAYH. The Senator is correct.
That is very important. I would refer
the Senator back to the definition which
I read into the RECORD at the time the
Senate passed this measure earlier this
year.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. It was
that definition which I was seeking to
reemphasize. May I ask one other ques-
tion? Is it not true that the inability
referred to must be expected to be of
long duration, or at least one whose
duration is uncertain and might persist?
Mr. BAYH. Here again I think one
of the advantages of this particular
amendment is the leeway it gives us. We
are not talking about the kind of in-
ability in which the President went to
the dentist and was under anesthesia.
It is not that type of inability we are
talking about, but the Cabinet, as well
as the Vice President and Congress, are
going to have to judge the severity of the
disability and the problems that face our
country.
Perhaps the Senator from New York
would like to rephrase the question.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Is it not
true that what we are talking about here,
as far as inability is concerned, is not a
brief or temporary inability?
Mr. BAYH. We are talking about one
that would seriously impair the Presi-
dent's ability to perform the powers and
duties of his office.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Could a
President have such inability for a short
period of time?
Mr. BAYH. A President who was un-
conscious for 30 minutes when missiles
were flying toward this country might
only be disabled temporarily, but it would
be of severe consequence when viewed in
the light of the problems facing the
country.
So at that time, even for that short
duration, someone would have to make a
decision. But a disability which has per-
sisted for only a short time would ordi-
narily be excluded. If a President were
unable to make an Executive decision
which might have severe consequences
for the country, I think we would be bet-
ter off under the conditions of the
amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. The
Senator realizes the complications for
the people of this country and the world
under those circumstances.
Mr. BAYH. I do, indeed. I also rec-
ognize our difficulty if we had no amend-
ment at all. The Senator from New
York realizes the consequences in that
case. The Senator is aware of the time
limitations which give the President a
certain amount of leeway now. If he re-
covers from the illness within the time
limitations, he would have protection un-
der the amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. As I said
at the beginning, I believe there should
be a continuing study of the problem.
Based on my own personal experience
and on what was brought out in the
hearings, I believe that members of the
Cabinet could be subjected to political
strains of one kind or another under cer-
tain circumstances of danger which
might arise for the United States. They
might be impelled to challenge the Presi-
dent's ability and capacity for the wrong
reasons. And when we think of the great
crisis in 1919 with President Wilson and
Mr. Lansing, it is apparent that under
the procedure set out in section 4 of Sen-
ate Joint Resolution 1 there could ac-
tually be a question as to who was acting
as President of the United States at a
particular time. That is why this sub-
ject should receive continuing study by
this body to determine whether an al-
ternative to the Cabinet's acting could
be evolved.
What if the President of the United
States made a decision which was very
unpopular with members of his Cabinet?
I think back to the time of Abraham
Lincoln in 1863. I think back to the
time of President Andrew Johnson, and
recall how unpopular he was with all the
members of his Cabinet. They could
have taken action, under the slightest
pretext, to have him removed. Even
with all the protections provided, I say
the situation is dangerous. We would
be deluding ourselves in thinking that
by adopting the amendment the danger
to our people and the people around the
world would disappear, because a danger
would still exist. The subject deserves
our continuing effort and attention.
Mr. BAYH. I agree. There is leeway
with respect to Congress and the com-
mittees and the Cabinet.
In discussing dangers to the people,
think of the danger after President Gar-
field had been felled by a bullet and we
had no President for 80 days. The dan-
ger of such a situation in this day and
age is considerably more than the dan-
ger that could arise if the provisions of
this amendment were invoked.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. That
is why I intend to support this amend-
ment.
Mr. BAYH. I appreciate the Senator's
comments.
CONTINUATION OF AUTHORITY
FOR REGULATION OF EXPORTS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield without losing the
floor?
Mr. BAYH. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
consent, for the purpose of providing
regular procedure, that the considera-
tion of Calendar No. 352, H.R. 7105, fol-
low consideration of the present confer-
ence report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
7105) to provide for continuation of au-
thority for regulation of exports, and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request? Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VA-
CANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the report of the committee of con-
ference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendment of the
House to the joint resolution (SJ. Res.
1) proposing an amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States relating to
succession to the Presidency and Vice-
Presidency and to cases where the Presi-
dent is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.
Mr. BAYH and Mr. McCARTHY ad-
dressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. McCARTHY. If it were not for
the fact that the amendment provides
that the Congress of the United States
has a right to designate some body other
than the Cabinet to pass upon the ques-
tion of Presidential disability, I could
not support the amendment. The Sen-
ator from New York has pointed out the
necessity, and I hope that the appro-
priate committees of the Congress and
the Congress will give consideration to
some other body's passing upon the ques-
tion of Presidential disability. If that
provision were not in the amendment, I
could not support the proposed amend-
ment, and I would urge its rejection.
History shows that it is better to have
one sane king rather than two who are
not, each one of them claiming to be the
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right king. There is the possibility of
a situation in which one man, having
been elected President, claims he was
capable of exercising the duties of his
office, and the other person, the Vice
President, engages in a letter-writing
contest as to which is the appropriate
man. There could be a body other than
the Cabinet which should have the abil-
ity to make a decision which would have
the effect of giving the American public
confidence in the person they had ap-
proved and a disposition not to accept
the authority of someone who would be
disapproved.
It is my judgment that it would have
been better to follow the recommenda-
tions made by the Senator from Illinois
[Mr. DIRKSEN] and not try to be so spe-
cific as provided in the present amend-
ment.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Let us
go back to another situation, which I
am sure the Senator from Indiana rec-
ognizes. A Cabinet decides that a Pres-
ident was disabled. The President fires
the Cabinet. The members of the Cab-
inet say they did not receive notice that
they were fired until after they had de-
clared the President disabled. The Pres-
ident says he fired them first. If the
Congress is in recess, the President ap-
points another Cabinet, or else he says
the Deputies and Under Secretaries are
now the Cabinet. There would be two
Presidents and two Cabinets. There
would be a conflict as to which ones
were the members of the Cabinet and
as to whether the members of the first
Cabinet had made the decision before
or after they were fired by the President.
It is recognized by the proposed leg-
islation that this is a problem. I do not
believe the danger disappears by the
adoption of the amendment. I do not
think, when we adopt the measure, that
the problems of our Executive are gone
and that we do not have to worry about
it any more. We have to continue to
worry about it. Although the legislation
is better than the situation at the pres-
ent time, there will be situations which
might cause difficulty.
Mr. McCARTHY. Generally speak-
ing, it is better, but there could be worse
situations arising under the amendment
than there would have been under the
indeterminate and vague way in which
we could have moved.
The amendment has nothing to say
about whether the executive officers
who pass on the disability have been
confirmed by the Senate. This is a
point which might well be included in
the amendment. I believe that they
have to be executive officers confirmed
by the Senate. We woe uld have to work
out the making of temporary appoint-
ments. The Senator from New York
said that we could have two Cabinets.
This would be something like the old
days in Avignon, when there were :two
Popes, which created :a. great deal of
trouble, the-same kind. of trouble which
was created for- many, many years in
England when two Kings claimed the
crown. It has meant nothing but
trouble.
I do not know whether, under this
amendment, the executive officers would
have to be confirmed by the Senate.
They could be temporary appointees,
which could be passed upon by the Sen-
ate.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Minnesota yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAR-
Ris in the chair). Does the Senator
from Minnesota yield to the Senator
from Tennessee?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. GORE. The Senator from Min-
nesota finds some consolation in the fact
that, if I have understood him correctly,
the amendment provides that Congress
could designate another body by law.
I invite his attention to the possibility
that this could compound the question,
because the amendment reads:
Whenever the Vice President and a ma-
jority of either officers of the executive de-
partments or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide.
I should like to inquire of the Senator
if, in addition-
Mr. McCARTHY. Ask the Senator
from Indiana.
Mr. GORE. There would be a pos-
sibility of a contest or controversy be-
tween the Cabinet that may or may not
have been dismissed, and one which may
or may not have been confirmed by the
Senate. Might there not be the prob-
ability of a contest between the two
groups which, by the conjunction or, are
permitted to perform the same function?
Mr. McCARTHY. I believe that there
is great uncertainty as to whether Con-
gress could act and designate some other
group, or define the executive officers
who were to pass upon this question-
officers who would be approved by Con-
gress. But this is an open question. I
should like to ask the Senator from Indi-
ana whether this is an open question, or
whether there is some uncertainty.
Mr. BAYH. First, let me go into a
brief explanation of why this provision
was included. This was the result of the
consensus meeting with scholars and ex-
Attorneys General whom I shall not
bother to enumerate, trying for the first
time in congressional history to weld to-
gether the 42 different proposals which
previously came before Congress. This
has always been historically a problem,
in trying to reach agreement and to rec-
oncile the differences in order to obtain
a two-thirds majority.
It was felt that if there was an arbi-
trary Cabinet that completely -refused to
go along with the fact that the Presi-
dent, who was obviously disabled, was
disabled-the condition referred- to by
the Senator from New York-the Presi-
dent might get wind of it and, although
he might be in' extremely bad condition,
he might manage to have issued a docu-
ment fiirng'the Cabinet. This would not
preclude Congress, in its wisdom, from
establishing another panel, perhaps, of
the majority and minority -leaders of
both Houses; the: Chief -Justice of the
Supreme. Court. )We- in- our wisdom as
Members. of- Congress, would: do so -be-
cause it is wise.- This body, `ih' conjunc-
tion with the Vice President, could make
its determination.
Mr. McCARTHY. In the meantime,
who would control the Army, Navy, and
Air Force?
Mr. BAYH. The President of the
United States.
Mr. McCARTHY. Whoever he might
be.
Mr. BAYH. Whoever he might be.
Mr. McCARTHY. Which one might
be?
Mr. BAYH. He would be the Presi-
dent until a declaration from the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet
or the other body had been made and
received by the Speaker-
Mr. McCARTHY. We do not accept
the determination of this body. We are
going to set up another body.
Mr. BAYH. That is correct.
Mr. McCARTHY. Congress would
have to act quickly to set up another
body which might act in such a case.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. GORE. The answer of the Sen-
ator from Indiana indicates that he is
thinking of the possibility of action by
Congress at such time, and after such
time as there may be an obstinate, non-
existent, or otherwise inactive Cabinet.
As I read the proposed amendment,
Congress could, by law, provide now, sub-
sequent to approval of this amendment-
Mr. BAYH. The Senator is correct.
Mr. GORE. For such a body. Or,
to add still further to the uncertainty,
it could await such time as the Senator
has foreseen when, because of uncer-
tainties, or because of uncertainties
which are not now unforeseen. Con-
gress could act at that time.
SMr. McCARTHY. I am not sure
whether this body could not be a body
within the Congress itself.
Mr. GORE. Will the Senator yield
once more?
Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield
to the Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. GORE. This is done specifically
for the purpose of giving Congress a cer-
tain. amount of leeway which the Sen-
ator from Minnesota feels it should have?
Mr. BAYH. I should be glad to re-
spond to that. Any time Congress in its
wisdom thought it necessary,: if further
discussion and deliberation on this issue
by Congress led it to believe that another
body should be established, it could es-
tablish it.
Mr. GORE. Do I correctly understand
the able Senator to say that Congress
could, immediately upon adoption of this
constitutional amendment, provide by
law for such a body as herein specified
and that, then, either a majority of this
body created by law or a majority of the
Cabinet could perform this function?
Mr. BAYH. No. The Cabinet has the
primary responsibility.: If it is replaced
by ,Congress with :another body, the
Cabinet loses the responsibility, and it
rests solely in the other body.
Mr. GORE. But the amendment does
not sa:provide. :
:Mr.:BAYH-. Yes, it does.- It states-
* :Mr. GORE. The word is "or."'
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Mr. BAYH. It says "or." It does not
say "both." "Or such other body as
Congress may by law prescribe."
SI wish the RECORD to be abundantly
clear that that is the case. I am glad the
Senator brought up that point. I be-
lieve that this colloquy on that point is
important and should be added to that
already in the RECORD.
The Cabinet, upon enactment of rati-
fication, has the responsibility, unless
Congress chooses another body, at which
time that other body, and that other
body alone, working in conjunction with
the Vice President, has the responsibility.
Indeed, Congress may choose a third
body.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. GORE. I suppose it might be
possible to read legislative intent into
this conjunction, but----
Mr. BAYH. If I may interrupt here-
let me read the exact wording: "and ',
majority of either the principal officers of
the executive departments or-"
Either/or "of such other body as Con-
gress may by law provide."
So when there is an "either/or" solu-
tion, it nails it down to one or the other.
Mr. GORE. It seems to me that if it is
"either/or" it places the two on a par---
Mr. BAYH. I do not see how that
would be the case at all. The Cabinet
has the responsibility. What if Congress
by law should provide for another body
that it feels should have the responsi-
bility?
Mr. GORE. Then it has such a re-
sponsibility, too.
Mr. BAYH. Then it has such a re-
sponsibility, too.
Mr. McCARTHY. Could we not have
both?
Mr. BAYH. If we have one or the
other, we do not have both. If I have
apples or pears, I do not have both.
Mr. MCCARTHY. Under the language
of the amendment we could keep the
Cabinet and set up another body. We
could run it through two or three bodies,
and have the Cabinet act and then have
the other body act.
Mr. BAYH. Whatever body acts
should act quickly.
Mr. McCARTHY. The Vice President
would have to act with either body. We
might have a Vice President who would
be reluctant to take office, and the Gov-
ernment would be paralyzed, unless the
Vice President were willing to say, "I
believe the President is not able to act."
Mr. BAYH: It would be possible to im-
peach the President and the Vice Presi-
dent. -
Mr. MCCARTHY. It would not be:pos-
sible to impeach the Vice President un-
less he were not willing to preside over
the Senate or to vote in the case of a
tie.
Mr. BAYH. We cannot put the Vice
President in office if he is unwilling to
assume the office.
Mr. MCCARTHY. He might be suffer-
ing ;from inability ; himself, even before
't~e-l'Prsident. 
-I believe te amlieidment
should 1 provide1 that the 'elected officefs
of the iGovenmieint,"6f t•if'he' Hoitiad
Senake;sh6ulld'decide tihat'the President
is unable to fulfill the duties of his office,
and we ought to be able to move directly.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I should
like to direct questions to the distin-
guished Senator from Indiana, who is
managing the conference report. I join
with all my colleagues in paying tribute
to the Senator for sponsoring the pro-
posed constitutional amendment and for
his persistent effort to bring it to final
action. I raise these questions with re-
spect to particular phraseology of the
amendment. I quote this language:
Whenever the Vice President and a ma-
jority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate.
And so forth. The language is re-
peated in the next paragraph.
Is it the intention of Congress, as in-
terpreted by the Senator from Indiana,
who is in charge of the conference report,
that the Vice President and a majority
of the principal officers of the executive
departments would transmit the infor-
mation of the President's inability to
perform his duties to Congress, unless
Congress had by legislative action pro-
vided for the establishment of another
body to perform this function?
Mr. BAYH. I should like to answer
the Senator's question by setting up a
hypothetical example. If the President
became disabled, the Vice President
would get the Cabinet together and say,
"Gentlemen, I think the best interests of
the country would be served if I, reluct-
ant as I am, assumed the powers and
duties of President."
The Cabinet, let us assume, would
refuse to agree.
Congress, in its wisdom, upon studying
the situation, and the obvious physical
condition of the President, might judge
that the Vice President was correct.
At that particular time Congress
might by law set up another body. This
body, upon agreeing with the Vice Presi-
dent, again might declare that the Presi-
dent was unable to perform his duties.
At this time the Vice President would
assume the office of Acting President.
Mr. COOPER. Then it is the inten-
tion, that this function and duty shall be
that of the Vice President and the Cab-
inet unless the Congress provides that it
shall be performed by another body.
Is that correct?
Mr. BAYH. The Senator is correct.
'Mr. COOPER. The duty would fall
on .the Vice President and the Cabinet,
unless Congress by law provided that it
should be the function of some other
body created by Congress. Is that
correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. COOPER. It is intended that the
words "principal officers of the executive
departmeits" mean all the members of
the Cabinet?
. Mr. BAYH. 'The Senator is correct.
It means the official members of the
"Cabinet.
Mr. COOPER. In case "the Cabinet
acted> andi perfitied? this fuificiol•n, the
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assent of the Vice President would be
required, even though a majority of the
Cabinet members were willing to trans-
mit information to the Congress that the
President suffered from an inability.
Mr. BAYH. The Vice President must
be a party to the decision.
Mr. COOPER. I believe it is well to
have an answer to another question. In
the event Congress decided to enact leg-
islation to provide that another body, a
body other than the Cabinet and the Vice
President, should perform this function,
would the Vice President be required to
concur in the recommendation of such
other body?
Mr. BAYH. Yes, he would.
Mr. COOPER. Not unless Congress
so provided in legislation that it might
enact?
Mr. BAYH. The wording of the
amendment would permit two separate
agencies, either the Vice President and
the Executive Cabinet, or the Vice Pres-
ident and the other body.
Mr. COOPER. As I understood the
question raised by the Senator from
Tennessee and the Senator from Minne-
sota, it was their fear that both the
Cabinet and the Vice President, and an-
other body which Congress might estab-
lish, might claim the authority to per-
form this function. The question of the
Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] ex-
pressed concern that the words "either"
and "or" might give rise to a situation
in which the Vice President and a ma-
jority of the Cabinet, and a body which
Congress might establish, would both
claim the authority to exercise the func-
tion. Is there any problem about the use
of those words that troubles the Sena-
tor from Indiana?
Mr. BAYH. That is a good point to
clarify for the RECORD. However, in my
mind it is perfectly clear that if I said
I would go to the office of either the
Senator from Kentucky or the Senator
from Tennessee, my statement would not
reasonably be interpreted to indicate
that I would go to both. It would be
either one or the other.
Mr. COOPER. Then'the intent of the
conference committee was that the lan-
guage meant that unless another body
were established by law, the Vice Presi-
dent and the Cabinet would perform the
function; but in the event that Congress
should establish another body by law,
that body alone would have the authority
to exercise the function, and in that
event, the Vice President and the Cabi-
net would be without authority to exer-
cise the function.
Mr. BAYH. It would then be exer-
cised by the Vice President and the other
body. The Cabinet would be out of the
picture at that time.
Mr. COOPER. I raise another ques-
tion. Would the Vice President have
any part to play in the decision in the
event that another body were estab-
lished?
i Mr. BAYH. The =answer' is "Yes."
The Vice President must make a sepa-
rate determination with either the Cabi-
net or another body.
Mr:. COOPER. In either event the
Vice President must participate?
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Mr. BAYH. I think it is wise to bring
out this point. I wish the RECORD to
show that we do not desire two bodies
to make the decision with the Vice Presi-
dent. If in its wisdom the Congress
should decide that another body should
make the determination, in the public
interest of the country, as the Senator
from New York and the Senator from
Minnesota feel would be the case, and
the Congress should go to the trouble of
passing proposed legislation appointing
such another body, at that time the
newly created body and not the Cabinet
would act with the Vice President.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BAYH. I yield.
Mr. GORE. I should like to submit a
question to the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Kentucky, who has been a dis-
tinguished judge. Suppose in conse-
quence of the amendment, Congress
should proceed by law to create such a
body as has been referred to. Then
suppose at some foreseeable period a Vice
President should appear before such a
body, or with such a body, and that body
should decline to act. Would there be
any reason why, under the constitutional
amendment, the Vice President and a
majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments could not then
act?
Mr. COOPER. That is one of the
questions which the Senator from Ten-
nessee originally posed, and it is a ques-
tion to which I have directed questions
to the Senator from Indiana, [Mr. BAYH].
It is easy for one who was not a member
of the conference committee and one who
is not on the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments and did not partici-
pate in its work, and one who has not
worked on the question as has the dis-
tinguished Senator from Indiana and the
distinguished Senator from Nebraska
[Mr. HRUSKA], to raise questions. I ad-
mit it, but I think it important that ques-
tions be asked on such an important
matter. It is easy also, with hindsight,
to think of better language. But I must
say, that I believe the language could be
clearer. The answers of the Senator
from Indiana have been directed to the
intent of the committee respecting the
language. The courts pay attention, but
not all, to such declarations of intent.
Mr. GORE. If that is what the con-
ferees mean, I suggest that the amend-
ment should so provide. We are not
passing on conversations held between
the conferees. The Congress is asked
to adopt language which provides that-
Whenever the Vice President and a major-
ity of either the principal officers of the ex-
ecutive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide.
That is what is before the Senate. Un-
doubtedly there have been many confer-
ences and colloquies, but the language
should be explicit when it becomes a part
of the U.S. Constitution.
SMr. COOPER. The reason I directed
questions to the Senator from Indiana
IMr. BATH], was that his answers as the
Senator in charge of the bill are impor-
tant in the interpretation of the
amendment.
Mr. BAYH. The language to which
the Senator has referred has not been
changed one iota from the specific lan-
guage which was passed by this body.
The conference report does not alter that
language. Any interpretation of the
Constitution, as the Senator knows, in-
cludes reference to the record of the
debate, the record of the hearings, and
specific interpretations placed upon the
measure by the Senator in charge of the
bill. Those who have been in particular
intimate touch with it are those whose
statements are considered in an inter-
pretation of the measure. The Senator
has made a considerable contribution to
the debate by raising that point at the
present time.
Mr. COOPER. The statements of the
Senator from Indiana are more impor-
tant than our statements.
Mr. BAYH. I would not go along with
the Senator from Kentucky on that.
Mr. COOPER. From a legal stand-
point, that is correct, for the Senator
from Indiana is the Senator in charge of
the bill. The Senator's statements bear
upon the intent of the Senate to a greater
degree than our statements would.
Mr. BAYH. I have made as crystal
clear as I know how that the Vice Presi-
dent must make a determination, and he
would make that determination with the
Cabinet unless the Congress---
Mr. GORE. But the word "unless" is
not in the amendment.
Mr. BAYH. If the Senator from Ten-
nessee would like to listen to my thoughts
on the point, I should be glad to state
them for the RECORD.
Mr. GORE. But the Senator has used
a word that is not in the proposed
amendment.
Mr. BAYH. I should be glad to change
the word I have used if that would help
the Senator. I have not been able to
make the interpretation clear by using
another word; I thought I would try a
little different approach.
Mr. GORE. I can understand the dif-
ficulty of making the point clear by using
the language of the amendment, because
the language of the amendment, in my
opinion, does not support the interpre-
tation which the able Senator has given
to it. I would be glad, however, to listen
to his interpretation.
Mr. BAYH. I really have nothing to
offer that I have not already offered-
perhaps insufficiently-to the Senator
from Tennessee. The Vice President
would make the determination with one
of two bodies or three bodies. The choice
would not necessarily be limited to one
other body. The Congress might, in its
wisdom 100 years from now, decide to
choose the third body. One of those
bodies would be the body with which the
Vice President would act. Let the REC-
ORD so state. That is what the commit-
tee feels. That is what I, as the original
sponsor of the measure, feel. That is
what the conferees believe. I do not
know how we can get into the RECORD
a stronger interpretation than that
which has been brought out by the pene-
trating questioning of the Senator from
Tennessee.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BAYH. I am happy to yield.
Mr. GORE. If that is the clear intent
of the authors of the amendment and the
conferees, why cannot the conferees re-
turn to their labors and prepare lan-
guage that is explicit?
Mr. BAYH. The Senator from Ten-
nessee has been in the halls of this great
body much longer than has the junior
Senator from Indiana. I do not believe
that it is necessary for his extremelyjunior colleague to point out that we
have been 178 years getting a measure on
this subject even voted upon in either
House of Congress. I do not need to
point out that it has been 18 months and
more the subject of deliberation by both
Houses of Congress to get it thus far.
It took us almost 2 months in the
conference committee alone. I would
seriously doubt the wisdom of going back
to the conferees to risk undoing every-
thing that has been done-the House
already adopted the conference report
this afternoon at a quarter after twelve-
on the premise that we cannot under-
stand what is in the measure. The Sen-
ator from Indiana, with all respect, feels
that we have written a very good record
as to what that language means, if, in-
deed, there is any doubt of its proper
interpretation. The Senator from Ten-
nessee is a student of law and has ex-
pressed doubt. For that reason, we have
gone to some length to explain what
the interpretation of the language is.
Mr. GORE. If I understand the rule
of construction as to legislative intent
and the interpretation of that intent is
looked to only when there is doubt as to
the exact and precise meaning of a stat-
ute or constitutional provision.
The able Senator has given us what
he regards as the legislative intent. I
do not doubt that what he has stated is
the legislative intent. But why will the
legislative intent be searched out and in-
terpreted to ascertain the meaning of
language which states clearly that the
Vice President, acting either with a ma-
jority of the Cabinet or with a majority
of a body created by Congress can certify
the disability of the President? Can
this mean that Congress could by statute
eliminate the function of the Cabinet
though it could strip such power from
a majority of the Cabinet even though
such powers would have been vested by
the proposed constitutional amendment?
It seems to me that that is an unrea-
sonable assumption. It is regrettable
that for so long a time this constitutional
need has not been met. It is to be re-
gretted that 18 months have passed in
which this problem has not been dealt
with satisfactorily. But I doubt whether
that is any excuse to proceed in one
afternoon, on the floor of the Senate,
to adopt a conference report containing
an ambiguous provision, when the au-
thor of the amendment himself and the
conferees themselves say it does not
mean what it says.
Mr. BAYH. The Senator from Indiana
does not agree with the Senator from
Tennessee that the amendment does not
mean what it says. I differ with the in-
terpretation of the Senator from Ten-
nessee. The RECORD will show that the
Senate spent almost 7 hours debating the
subject earlier in this session, and that
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the Senator from Tennessee participated
in the debate.
I am not saying that reasonable men
cannot disagree, but I am saying that,
in my estimation, the interpretation is
clear. I am further saying that if I am
any judge of what Congress might do
when confronted with situations pro-
vided for in this measure-and the Sen-
ator from Tennessee is probably a better
judge than I of what this body might do,
because he has served considerably
longer and with much greater distinc-
tion-I presume that our successors on
a later scene in this body, if confronted
with a situation that they believed the
Cabinet could deal with-it might be to-
morrow-would, in the enactment of a
law specifying another body, be astute
enough to use enough words to satisfy
themselves that such a body would in
fact replace the Cabinet, pursuant to
constitutional authority.
The Senator from Tennessee knows
that it is much easier to be specific and
to provide much greater detail in a stat-
ute than in a constitutional amendment.
I believe we would have been in error to
have written all this language into the
Constitution. I believe we have been
specific enough to have covered the in-
tent.
Mr. GORE. Is it the Senator's inter-
pretation that the language should read
somewhat as follows:
Whenever the Vice President and a major-
ity of either the principal officers of the ex-
ecutive departments or, in the event Con-
gress creates another body pursuant to
law, then the Vice President and a majority
of such other body as Congress by law shall
create-
Mr. BAYH. I see no objection to that
interpretation of what is written in the
amendment.
Mr. GORE. If that is what is in-
tended, why could not the conferees write
it into the amendment? I do not believe
the amendment is subject.to that kind of
interpretation, though, as the Senator
says, that is the legislative intent.
Mr. BAYH. I feel, with all due respect
to the Senator from Tennessee, that the
interpretation is clear that if Congress
specifies another body, it will not do so
as a lark; it will do so because it wants
another body to replace the Cabinet,
which would have the primary respon-
sibility until Congress precribed another
body.
The Senator from Tennessee knows
that if there were to be a conference for
every little misinterpretation that might
be involved among 100 Senators, we
would never obtain a conference report.
The Senator from Tennessee is more
aware of this than I, because he was serv-
ing on conference committees before I
was out of knee pants.
Mr. GORE. I appreciate all the nice
compliments, but I doubt if that is a com-
pliment.
Mr. BAYH. The Senator from Indiana
intended it to be a compliment, because
the Senator from Tennessee knows how
much respect the Senator from Indiana
has for him.
Mr. GORE. I appreciate the respect;
but do not put too much longevity on me.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BAYH. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. I have joined the dis-
tinguished Senator from Indiana for a
long time in the endeavor to solve the
problem and am a cosponsor of Senate
Joint Resolution 1. I should now like
to propound a series of questions to him,
in an endeavor to pinpoint what he has
said in the answers he has given to other
Senators.
First, would the Vice President, under
section 4, have to act with a majority
of the principal officers of the executive
departments or of the other body that
Congress would provide by law, or would
he act in and of himself, sending to Con-
gress whatever notices he wished?
Mr. BAYH. It has to be joint action.
Mr. JAVITS. Both have to act; but
it does not have to be joint action in the
sense that he is presiding over any body.
Mr. BAYH. No.
Mr. JAVITS. He sends his notice and
the executive body sends its notice.
Mr. BAYH. Either way; or they
could act together.
Mr. JAVITS. But they could act sep-
arately.
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. If they were hostile, they
could act separately.
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. The action must be
taken by a majority vote?
Mr. BAYH. Majority vote.
Mr. JAVITS. Suppose they did not
like each other. If they separately noti-
fied Congress, would that satisfy the
amendment?
Mr. BAYH. I think that would satisfy
the qualification.
Mr. JAVITS. Congress may, by law,
provide for another body. May it pro-
vide that that other body shall be the
Cabinet?
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. It may provide at the
same time that it shall be the Cabinet
only if it is composed of officers whose
nominations have been confirmed by the
Senate, not temporary appointees.
Mr. BAYH. The Senator from New
York brings out a good point.
Mr. JAVITS. So we could do that
ourselves by law?
Mr. BAYH. That is correct.
Mr. JAVITS. We could make them
the body.
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. Could we also, by law,
say that when we create the body, we
settle the question of "either"; that is,
that only one can take action; that
whatever body we create, it is exclusive?
Mr. BAYH. That is what I was trying
to point out.
Mr. JAVITS. Let us point it out now
and nail it down.
Mr. BAYH. Congress in its wisdom
could, in the enactment of the law,
specify that the body should take the
place of the Cabinet, and a new Cabinet
could be created.
Mr. JAVITS. The body created by
Congress is exclusive?
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. Whether Congress
would or would not specify that the body
should take the place of the Cabinet
neither the Senator from Indiana nor I
know. But the point is that Congress
could.
Mr. BAYH. That would depend upon
the wisdom of those who follow us,
Mr. JAVITS. Congress could make
the body it created exclusive?
Mr. BAYH. Yes.
Mr. JAVITS. Twenty-one days are
provided in which the Congress must act
on determination of Presidential dis-
ability. Congress has provided, implic-
itly under the 21-day limitation, restric-
tions on a filibuster, a precedent for
which is contained in the Reorganiza-
tion Act.
Mr. BAYH. At the end of the 21-day
period, nothing would prevent Congress
from continuing to discuss the situation;
but at the end of 21 days, the President
would resume his office.
Mr. JAVITS. Nonetheless, Congress
could protect itself against filibusters by
writing an antifilibuster rule into the
statute that would be passed to imple-
ment the amendment, could it not?
Mr. BAYH. That is correct.
Mr. JAVITS. Congress has done that
under the Reorganization Act. The Sen-
ator may take my word for that.
Mr. BAYH. Of course. I was trying
to tie it in with this particular issue.
There would be nothing to preclude Con-
gress from establishing rules as to how
to use the 21 days. Congress could in-
corporate any rule it desired.
Mr. JAVITS. Sc inaction would re-
store the President to office.
Mr. BAYH. Yes. We are trying to
place a safeguard around the President.
Mr. JAVITS. Why is there not a ge-
neric clause providing that Congress
shall have power to pass legislation to
implement the amendment, as, for exam-
ple, was done with respect to section 2
of the 14th amendment? I have tried,
by the questions and answers that have
been propounded and given, to show that
there is ample opportunity and ample
authority for Congress to act. Will the
Senator now tell us whether there was
any reason for not having a boilerplate
implementing clause with respect to Con-
gress?
Mr. BAYH. Yes; that is a good point.
The Senator may recall that we discussed
it at some length. When the distin-
guished Senator from Illinois and the
distinguished Senator from Minnesota
attempted to remove most, if not all, of
the provisions from the bill, sections 3,
4, 5, and 6, as they were before, were
incorporated. They do not constitute
merely permissive legislation on the part
of Congress.
There is considerable discussion
among constitutional scholars, the pres-
ent Attorney General, Attorney General
Brownell, and three or four previous
Attorneys General who feel doubt as to
whether a statute would be constitu-
tional. They say, "Let us not wait until
we are confronted with a crisis concern-
ing the disability of the President to have
it tested. Let us put it in the bedrock
law of the land and eliminate doubt as to
whether it is constitutional."
Second-and I believe it is more signif-
icant-is the fact that we have tried to
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provide the President of the United
States with the kind of safeguards that
he needs when he must make unpopular
decisions which are necessary for the
safety of our country. For that reason,
we have required that the approval of
two-thirds of the Senate shall be neces-
sary before the President can be removed
from office by impeachment. Thus, a
hostile Congress cannot remove a Presi-
dent who is unpopular at the time be-
cause: of decisions _which he has made.
Once he is elected President, he serves
for 4 years.
If we were to take the statutory means,
although it would still require two-thirds
of the Senate to remove a President from
office under impeachment proceedings,
a majority of 51 Senators could remove
a President for disability and thus get
around the two-thirds safety clause con-
tained in our present impeachment
statute. Thus we feel that if we were
to have a provision placed in the Con-
stitution requiring the approval of two-
thirds of both Houses of the Congress,
we would have given the President much
more safety than a mere act of Congress,
which is the original case, providing that
two-thirds of the House and Senate
would be required to declare a President
disabled rather than a simple majority.
This could be changed at any time in
our history.
I believe that this is important enough
so that we should demand that the ap-
proval of two-thirds of the Congress be
required before a President could be re-
moved from office.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator, however, affirms to us that Congress
has full latitude to pass the necessary
enabling legislation under the authority
of what is meant by "such other body as
Congress may by law :,rovide."
Mr. BAYH. The Senator .is correct.
Mr. JAVITS. Congress has the right
to provide for the exclusivity of that
body in exercising this authority, as well
as the way in which the body shall ex-
ercise that authority, and other perti-
nent details necessary to the creation of
such a body, its continuance; its way of
meeting, the rules of the procedure, and
the way in which it shall exercise its
power.
Mr. BAYH. The Senator is correct.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, what was
the beginning of that question?
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator in charge
of the bill affirms to us that Congress,
under this amendment, would have full
authority to enact a law, not only creat-
ing this body, but also giving it exclu-
sivity in respect of its action under this
particular amendment, and determining
its procedure, how it shall be formed, and
so forth.
Mr. :GORE. This would not be by
terms of the amendment itself, but would
be by way of legislative intent?
Mr. JAVITS. No. I should say that
it is by the express terms of the amend-
ment itself, by the following words, "such
other body as Congress may by law pro-
vide." -
I believe that the words "by law pro-
vide" is what the Senator in charge of
the bill is implementing now in his state-
ment concerning what the law which
creates this body can cover.
Mr. GORE. Congress could not en-
act a law which would be superior to a
provision of the Constitution.
Mr. JAVITS. Certainly not.
Mr. GORE. This would then be a
provision of the U.S. Constitution, let me
remind the Senator, which would pro-
vide, in explicit language that "Either a
majority of the principal officers of the
executive department, or such body as
the Congress may by law create."
I doubt-that the fact that Congress is
authorized to create by law another body
could reasonably be interpreted .as con-
veying authority and power to deny to a
majority of the Cabinet powers that the
Constitution would then by this amend-
ment vest.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I can
only give the Senator my view-and I
do this with great humility-and my
opinion as a lawyer.
Mr. GORE. I am not as learned as
the distinguished Senator, but I believe
that my interpretation is reasonable.
Mr. JAVITS. I do not believe so, and
I shall explain to the Senator my view.
In a situation in which the Congress has
conferred, and enacted legislation pro-
viding for a new body, and it would be my
judgment, if I were a judge sitting on a
case involving the constitutionality of
that legislation that if that power of
Congress were exercised, it was exercised
to give exclusivity to the other body. I
believe that the court would construe
this amendment to most feasibly accom-
plish the purpose of Congress. As the
purpose of Congress is to settle this kind
of issue, rather than leave it in a great
area of uncertainty and controversy,
would it not be completely contrary to
the purpose of Congress to create two
bodies which could compete with one
another?
I believe that the construction which
the courts would give to what we are do-
ing is that if the Congress were to exer-
cise the authority that the amendment
would give, the courts would hold that
that body has exclusivity as to its action.
That is my opinion as a lawyer, and I
have submitted my reasons to the Sen-
ator.
Mr. GORE. The Senator speaks quite
ably, and whether he is a judge, a cit-
izen, a Senator, or a practicing attorney,
I respect his opinion.
The points that I raise concern the
justification for throwing this ambiguous
question into the courts.
The time to be explicit is when we
write an amendment into the Constitu-
tion. I say quite frankly to the Senator
that I am unprepared to see this amend-
ment approved in this uncertain way,
with only a few Senators on the :floor.
I should like to see the proposal ex-
amined further, to my own possible
satisfaction, to determine the exclusivity
to which the Senator refers. I am not
sure that comports. with the rules of
construction. .
Mr. JAVITS. I should welcome the
Senator's researching the matter. -I
have no quarrel whatever with the- de-
sire of the Senator to examine into the
question .carefully. . - . ,
I am satisfied that this is what the
proposal would do. I am speaking only
for myself. I have great respect and
regard for the Senator. I would stand
aside to enable the Senator to satisfy
himself by appropriate research to de-
termine whether this is the way in which
it' should be handled.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr., COOPER. Mr. President, a few
mpments ago when I addressed questions
to the Senator from Indiana, my purpose
was the same as that of the: Senator
from New York, to ascertain that if the
first procedure were followed-which
concerns the Cabinet and the Vice Presi-
dent, whether it. would possess exclu-
sivity in its authority to act; and to as-
certain if Congress were to create an-
other body, such a body would have the
exclusivity to which the Senator has
referred.
I agree wholeheartedly, with the posi-
tion of the Senator from New York, and
also with his view that the courts would
consider the purpose of the proposed
amendment and not do an exercise in
futility.
I believe that it would be unreasonable
to follow any other position.
I ask the Senator if in his good judg-
ment he.believes that the language which
proposes the alternative procedure is
ambiguous of such ambiguity as to create
a situation in which it would be unclear
as to whether the Vice President and the
Cabinet or the Vice President and the
body established by the Congress would
have authority to act. Such a situation
would be the last thing that we would
desire.
Mr. JAVITS. I do not believe it is so
ambiguous as to make it unclear. It is
not the optimum nor the most. precise
language. Every Senator and lawyer
may have his opinion, and my colleague
from Kentucky, in my judgment, yields
to no other Senator in his distinction as
a lawyer but to me it is not so ambiguous
as to be unclear. It is not the optimum
language that I or the Senator from
Tennessee or the Senator from Kentucky
or other Senators might have sought, but
I feel that I could vote for it in good
conscience.
I agree with what the Senator has
said. I do not see any earth-shaking
necessity for not having a delay of a few
days to look it over; but if I had to vote
this afternoon, I would feel in good
conscience that I could vote "yea."
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, if the Sen-
ator will yield, is there any necessity to
vote this afternoon?
Mr. JAVITS. That has not been de-
termined. :But, as I have said, if I had
to, I would vote for it. :
Mr. GORE. The Senat6r' from New
York has raised a serious question.' The
Senator from Minnesota has raised a
serious question. The Senator from
Kentucky and the Senator fromi Ten-
nessee have expressed doubts.; It seems
to me welcould give ;.this matter a little
more cbnsideration than I admit I have
given it. Perhaps I have been derelict
in my. duty in not studying;it; more be-
fore now, but, as:I; listened.:to; qestions
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raised by the. Senator from New York
and ,the Senator from Minnesota and
began to read • and study the. conference
report, I detected language, that seemed
to me to be uncertain, if not ambiguous.
Mr. BAYH. Of course, the Senate of
the, United States is the world's greatest
deliberative body. -If my colleagues feel
it should be debated more, I believe we
should do so. I have tried, and will
:continue, to listen to every argument.
However, I have studied this measure
enough to know-and I say this from
the bottom of my heart-that if we ever
expect to have a constitutional amend-
ment on this important question, the
most complicated and intricate issue that
we have ever tried to put into the Con-
stitution, because of all the medical ram-
ifications and power struggles that might
exist-if we ever intend to get a measure
with respect to which there will not be a
scintilla of controversy, with very spe-
cific wording, we might as well termi-
nate the debate and throw this year and
a half's work in the ashcan, because we
are not going to do it.
I have never pretended to the Senate
or to my colleagues that this measure is
noncontroversial or that it would cover
every possible, conceivable contingency
that the mind of man could contrive. I
have suggested that it is the best thing
we have been able to come up with, and
it is so much better than anything we
have ever had before-namely, nothing-
that I dislike to see us, by delay, jeopar-
dize the great protection we would get
by this constitutional amendment.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BAYH. I am glad to yield.
Mr. GORE. I would not expect an
amendment to be drafted to meet the
imagination of all. The point I raise
here is that the able Senator brings to us
the intent of the amendment which, in
my view, is not supported by the language
of the amendment.
If this is the intention of the House
and Senate and the conferees represent-
ing those two bodies, surely the language
can be explicit.
I have previously referred to the lan-
guage as being ambiguous. I may have
used the wrong term. It seems to me it is
rather plainly stated that either the
Cabinet or the body to be created by
Congress could perform this official func-
tion.
There may be some way that the courts
could find that exclusivity ran to the
body created by law, but if that is the
intent, why leave the decision to a court
under some possibly tragic circumstance
that might arise? Surely, a few days of
delay- and a few days- of further, con-
sideration should not be interpreted as
being antagonistic to an amendment. On
the contrary, it; is suggested: as'; means
of permitting more careful consideration.
Mr. BAYH.: I appreciate the:Senator's
contribution.
'Mr. GORE. Mr. President I suggest
the absence of a quorum. ."
The,; PRESIDING OFFICER. :The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MUR-
PHY in the chair). Without objection, it
is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr.President, I ask
unanimous consent that the pending
business, the conference report on presi-
dential succession, be laid aside tempo-
rarily, pending conferences, and that the
Senate resume the consideration of the
Export Control Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
CONTINUATION OF AUTHORITY FOR
REGULATION OF EXPORTS
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill H.R. 7105 to provide for con-
tinuation of authority for regulation of
exports, and for other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that there be a
time limitation of 25 minutes on the de-
bate on the pending business, with 15
minutes allowed to the Senator from New
York [Mr. JAvrrs] and 10 minutes to the
Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE] who is
in charge of the bill on the Senate floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, before we
settle on that question, may we have a
quorum call? I should like to have the
Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WIL-
LIAMS] present. It may take a few
minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator permit the Chair to an-
nounce the agreement at the end of the
quorum call?
Mr. JAVITS. Yes. I suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. ' The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
for order in the Chamber. We are about
to discuss something totally different
from the presidential succession confer-
ence report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
KENNEDY of New York in the chair).
The Senate will be in order.
Is there objection to the unanimous-
consent request that there be a time
limitation of 25 minutes on the pending
bill, that 15 minutes be allotted to the
Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS]
and 10 minutes to the Senator from
Mainie: [Mr'MusKIE] ?' The Chair hears
none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield
myself 1 minute.
Mr:. President, the Export Control Act
of 1949 will expire at midnight tonight.
The Banking: and Currency 'Committee,
after two sets of hearings in the gen-
eral field, has reported the House bill on
the subject, H.R. 7105. We urge the
Senate to act at once on this bill so that
it can be sent to the President for his
signature before it expires.
This is essential because the Export
Control Act of 1949 is the act under
which exports of strategic and critical
materials from the United States are
kept from going behind the Iron Curtain.
In the absence of an extension, American
producers and shippers will be free to
send commercial and industrial mate-
rials and ,equipment to Communist
China, the ,U.S.S.R., and the rest of the
Soviet bloc.
The Banking and Currency Committee
has accepted the House bill, without
change.
The bill would accomplish three pur-
poses. First, it would extend the Export
Control Act for 4 more years-to June
30, 1969. Second, it would authorize the
administrative imposition of civil mone-
tary penalties not exceeding $1,000 for
violations of the act. Third, it will make
a formal declaration that--
it is the policy of the United States (A) to
oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts
fostered or imposed by foreign countries
against other countries friendly to the
United States and (B) to encourage and re-
quest domestic concerns engaged in the ex-
port of articles, materials, supplies, or in-
formation, to refuse to take any action,
including the furnishing of information or
the signing of agreements which have the
effect of furthering or supporting the re-
strictive trade practices or boycotts fostered
or imposed by any foreign country against
another country friendly to the United
States.
It will also require the issuance of reg-
ulations to implement this policy within
90 days after the enactment of the bill.
The bill leaves in the President the nec-
essary discretion as to the type and
terms and scope of these regulations.
This administrative flexibility is appro-
priate in view of the President's consti-
tutional role in the field of foreign
policy.
The committee's report contains a full
description of the Export Control Act
and its administration and enforcement.
It also contains a full description of the
several amendments made by the bill,
which need not be repeated here.
The committee in considering the bill
devoted considerable time to three
proposals.
The first was a proposal by Senator
WILLIAMS of New Jersey, to amend the
provisions of the bill relating to boy-
cotts, along the lines of the Senator's
bill S. 948, on which hearings had been
previously held. The committee agreed
that the general purpose of S. 948 should
be included in the bill. However, a ma-
jority of the committee felt that the pro-
visions included in the House bill con-
stituted an appropriate statement of
policy and supplied adequate legal basis
for enforcement of the policy, while at
the same time providing the necessary
flexibility to meet the changing needs
and circumstances of our foreign poli-
cies.
Another amendment, strongly: sup-
ported by Senator HARTKE, of Indiana,
and :other Senators, and strongly op-
posed by others, would have required the
impostion of quotas on exports of mate-
rials under certain circumstances-when
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It is my understanding that at that
time the distinguished Senator from
Oregon [Mr. MORSE] desires to have the
floor, and that he will be followed by the
distinguished Senator from Utah [Mr.
Moss], with some of the time in between
to be used by the distinguished Senator
from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
COMMrITEE MEETINGS DURING
SENATE SESSION TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that all commit-
tees be authorized to meet during the
session of the Senate tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND
VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT-CONFER-
ENCE REPORT
The Senate resumed the considera-
tion of the committee of conference on
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
on the amendment of the House to the
joint resolution (S.J. Res. 1) proposing
an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States relating to succession
to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency
and to cases where the President is un-
able to discharge the powers and duties
of his office.
UNANIMOUS-CON5ENT REQUVST
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that further
action on the pending conference report
be postponed until Tuesday next and
that at the conclusion of the routine
morning business on Tuesday next there
be 2 hours of debate on the conference
report, the time to be equally divided be-
tween the chairman of the subcommit-
tee, the distinguished Senator from In-
diana [Mr. BAYHI, and the distinguished
senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
GORE].
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object-and I shall not ob-
ject-in the event that one-third of the
Senate plus one wished to have the pro-
posed constitutional amendment re-
turned to conference, the only way that
purpose could be accomplished would
be to reject the conference report. That
could be accomplished by a nay vote
of one-third plus one of Senators voting.
The House could then be asked for a
further conference.
I do not wish to announce that either
I or the senior Senator from Minnesota
[Mr. McCARTHY] or any other Senator
will desire so to act. I expect to study
the proposed constitutional amendment
between now and next Tuesday. It is
my hope, as of now, that the amend-
ment will not ultimately be defeated. I
would much prefer to see the language
explicitly provide what the authors say
is intended. But I have entered into this
agreement and believe that in the event
it is desired to return the amendment to
conference, it can be accomplished if
two-thirds of the Senate wish to ratify
it as it is, regardless of what the minor-
ity might wish. That purpose could be
accomplished. I shall be amenable to the
decision of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Montana? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I should like to say
to the Senator from Tennessee that there
will be a yea-and-nay vote.
The unanimous-consent agreement
reduced to writing, is as follows:
UNANImIOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Ordered, That effective on Tuesday, July 6,
1965, at the conclusion of the routine morn-
ing business, further consideration of the
conference report on S.J. Res. 1, proposing
an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States relating to succession to the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency and to cases
where the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, be limited
to 2 hours of debate to be equally divided
and controlled by the Senator from Indiana
(Mr. BAYH) and the Senator from Tennessee(Mr. GonE).
JUNE 30, 1965.
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, this past
week marked the 20th anniversary of
the United Nations. It was an occasion
with mixed feelings and emotions. Even
many of its supporters would admit that
in recent years the United Nations had
fallen far short of the original hopes
for it. It had not produced peace in the
degree that was optimistically hoped for
20 years ago.
It was floundering on a financial issue
in which some key members refused to
pay their dues. It had proved so inept
and moribund in coping with interna-
tional aggression that the President of
the United States had repeatedly by-
passed it in coping with such crises as
Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.
On the occasion of its 20th birthday,
the United Nations was at its most vul-
nerable point to the criticism that it was
only a debating society. Added to this
criticism was the charge that it was
growing subservient to young, immature
small nations that belligerently de-
manded and got authority and power far
beyond their right and even their ability
to carry wisely and well-and yet, with-
out appropriately accompanying re-
sponsibility with such authority.
Members were not paying their dues-
there was open resentment by the Orga-
nization of American States at the at-
tempted intervention of the United Na-
tions in the Dominican controversy-
big powers courting small nations were
stooping below the dignity of responsible
nations and in doing so were inviting
contempt from the very small nations
they were courting. In short, the tail
was wagging the dog-a trembling, shaky
dog unsteadied by its tail-the small
nations.
But if the United Nations in its 20th
year had its grave weaknesses and had
disappointingly fallen far short of the
original hopes held for it, there were
some achievements that the 20 years had
produced. For one thing, the United
Nations in comparison with the ill-fated
League of Nations was a giant in inter-
national strength and influence. The
mere fact that it had survived was proof
enough of this.
True was the charge that it had dis-
appointingly failed to bring peace in the
measure it should. But undeniably, it
had brought some measure of peace.
While an undeclared war was being
fought in South Vietnam, while the Rus-
sian ravage of Hungary was unchal-
lenged by the United Nations, the United
Nations had played a very vital role in
resisting the invasion of South Korea
and in bringing about a peaceful cease-
fighting status there, however unsatis-
factory the compromise might have been.
And while it was true to a great degree
that the United Nations had been hardly
more than a debating society in a wind
tunnel of acrimonious oratory and po-
lemics, nevertheless it had achieved a
major accomplishment in that very role
in that it had kept men talking and de-
bating more often than fighting and
shooting. On balance it was a definite
plus and certainly not the tragic negative
that its enemies claimed.
For without doubt, the United Nations
had been a potent factor in the once
easing of the cold war and the develop-
ment of better relations between the
United States and Russia-and it had
been a factor in preventing general war.
And while it was experiencing its most
unsteady period in its 20 years of exist-
ence, the United Nations was not about
to go down for the count as did the
League of Nations after 20 years.
United Nations intervention in the
Korean conflict was perhaps its greatest
achievement. But in all honesty, we
must recognize that it was the fortuitous
circumstance of a Russian boycott of the
U.N. Security Council at the time. Had
not Russia so boycotted the Security
Council at that time but instead had been
present to vote, undoubtedly Russia
would have exercised her veto power and
thus prevented the United Nations from
intervening and going to the defense of
South Korea.
It is in this context that critics of U.S.
intervention in the Dominican Republic
crisis should view President Johnson's
circumvention of the United Nations.
This has an ironic note for it has been
generally acknowledged that Lyndon
Johnson has eagerly sought to be a Presi-
dent by consensus and to create the na-
tional image of being a consensus Presi-
dent.
Yet, in the international crises of Viet-
nam and the Dominican Republic, Presi-
dent Johnson has gone in the opposite
direction of consensus for he has not
sought the consensus of even our friendly
allies, much less the slow and cumber-
some Organization of American States
and the veto-plagued United Nations.
This points up the great difference in
the past between the free world and the
Communist world. Because the mem-
ber nations of the free world have acted
by consensus reached only after consid-
erable debate and time, the free world
has moved so tragically slower than the
Communist world in time of crises-and
Communist-created crises at that. In
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